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1. Introduction 
When Bruno was burned at the stake in 1600, philosophers were 
still inclined to offer natural explanations in Aristotelian terms. 
Neither the physical proposals of Bruno himself, nor those of other 
prominent non-Aristotelians like Paracelsus had diminished the power 
of the explanatory model offered by the scholastics. For those philoso-
phers watching the demise of Bruno in the Campo dei Fiori in Rome, 
the burning of the wood and its subsequent effects would have been 
explained adequately in terms of matter and substantial form. For such 
Aristotelian philosophers, all natural objects are constituted of matter 
and form, and natural events are explained in terms of the actualiza-
tion of the potency of these two "principles of nature." By the time 
Kenelm Digby composed his Two Treatises of 1644 and Thomas Hobbes 
his De Corpore in 1655, there was a new explanatory model available to 
explain such events, one that had greatly diminished the power of the 
scholastic model. 1 According to the mechanical philosophy, nature is 
composed of matter-whether the res extensa of Descartes, the atoms of 
Gassendi, or one of the many less popular accounts of corporeity-
whose actions and interactions cause and explain all the phenomena of 
nature. For the mechanist, therefore, all physical phenomena are to be 
explained in terms of some kind of matter and motion. Although these 
thinkers disagreed about how to define the material component in 
nature, they all took it to be entirely devoid of substantial forms. For 
our purposes here, it will be helpful to distinguish between first wave 
and second wave mechanists. A first wave mechanist is someone like 
Descartes, Galileo, Hobbes, or Gassendi who proposed a version of the 
mechanical explanatory model before (roughly) 1650. A second wave 
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mechanist is a philosopher working in the second half of the seven-
teenth century who accepts the mechanical explanatory model. For our 
purposes, it is important that many second wave mechanists were pre-
pared to reject the scholastic explanatory model, replace it with the 
mechanical one, and yet were not content to accept the metaphysical 
grounding of the mechanical physics offered by the first wave mechanists. 
I do not mean to imply that first wave mechanists like Descartes, 
Gassendi, Hobbes, and Galileo considered themselves players on the 
same team. While each of these "new" philosophers defined himself 
against the Aristotelians, each also identified himself in opposition to 
one or more of the others. Because many of the details of their views 
stand in contradistinction to one another (e.g., on the void, on the cause 
of motion, on the existence and nature of incorporeal beings, etc.), it is 
all the more striking that so many second wave thinkers tended to 
lump them together. Consider, for example, Anne Conway's Principles 
of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, written in the 1670s. 
Although Conway is keen to note the dissimilarities between 
"Cartesianism and Hobbesianism," the differences that interest her 
concern their views about "incorporeals" and "spirits." Distinguishing 
clearly between her "fundamental principles" and their "false philoso-
phy," she nonetheless admits "the remarkable and ingenious things 
concerning the mechanical aspects of natural processes" which are pro-
posed by these philosophers.2 It is important to recognize that despite 
the doctrinal dissimilarities among Descartes, Hobbes, Galileo, and 
Gassendi, and despite the fact that they saw themselves as very differ-
ent, their immediate successors were often happy to consider them 
members of the same school. 
The history of the mechanical philosophy and its contribution to 
what has traditionally been called "the scientific revolution" have been 
much discussed,a and the subtleties of the doctrinal differences among 
the "mechanical" philosophers have begun to be noted.4 Despite recent 
scholarly reevaluations of the demise of the Aristotelian philosophy and 
despite our greater understanding of the discrete forces behind the rise 
of the new physics, it remains a fact that the mechanical explanations 
of physical phenomena won the day against those of the Aristotelians. 
But what has gone mostly unnoticed in this account is that the meta-
physical foundations of that physical model were not a success. As 
Conway makes perfectly clear, the mechanical explanations are "inge-
nious" and helpful, but based on utterly "false principles." Such philoso-
phers, insists Conway, 
have generally erred and laid a poor foundation from the begin-
ning .... From such an absurd foundation, many other most crass 
and dangerous errors have arisen, not only in philosophy but also 
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in theology with great injury to the human race, to the detriment of 
true piety, and in contempt ofthe most glorious name of God.5 
This tension between physics and metaphysics-between the expla-
nations given of physical phenomena and the principles that underlie 
those explanations-had a major influence on seventeenth-century 
thinkers and hence on the development of early modern science. 
Conway, Leibniz, and other prominent seventeenth-century thinkers 
found severe problems with the metaphysical proposals of the "new 
philosophers." Many of these problems were generated by their account 
of matter. Among the most serious of these is that of substantial iden-
tity. That is, many second wave mechanists embraced the physical 
explanations of the new philosophy and yet rejected core doctrines of its 
proponents. 
In their eagerness to replace scholastic physical explanations with 
mechanical ones, philosophers like Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, and 
Gassendi either ignored or refused to answer a number of traditional 
metaphysical questions concerning identity, especially substantial iden-
tity.6 Because theological doctrines as important as the Eucharist and 
the resurrection of the body depend crucially on such an account, the 
failure of the mechanists in this regard seemed severe to many seven-
teenth-century thinkers. The failure of the first wave mechanists to 
offer adequate metaphysical grounding for such theological doctrines 
put many thoughtful philosophers in a difficult spot. On the one hand, 
they were persuaded by the physical explanations of the new mechani-
cal philosophy; on the other hand, they could not embrace a philosophy 
in tension with fundamental Christian doctrines. Some of these 
philosophers attempted to ground the new physics in a way that would 
accommodate their theological commitments. In this paper, I focus on 
one such theological doctrine, namely, the doctrine of the resurrection. 
After describing the doctrine, I present Aquinas' neat way of accounting 
for it, and then reveal the tension between the doctrine and the account 
of material substance assumed by first wave mechanical philosophers. I 
propose that many philosophers working in the second half of the sev-
enteenth century-many second wave mechanists-were critical of the 
mechanical philosophy for this reason. I use Leibniz as an example of 
someone willing to rework the mechanical philosophy so that it could 
accommodate the doctrine of resurrection. 
2. The Metaphysics of the Resurrection 
The Christian doctrine of the resurrection creates severe metaphysical 
demands on any thinker concerned to construct a philosophy consistent 
with Christian theology. Many fundamental Christian beliefs depend 
125 
GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL 
on the fact that human beings will be resurrected, as was Jesus Christ 
before them. The doctrine maintains that at some time in the future, 
our immortal soul will be reunited with its long-buried mortal body. 
Paul makes clear the centrality of the doctrine: 
Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ 
Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried therefore with 
him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the 
dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of 
life. For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we 
shall certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his. We 
know that our old self was crucified with him so that the sinful 
body might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to 
sin. For he who has died is freed from sin. But if we have died with 
Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him. (Romans 6.3-8)7 
Although Paul himself seems to distinguish between the body of the 
flesh and the "spiritual body" (1 Corinthians 15.42), the idea evolved 
among Christian theologians that the resurrected body must be (in 
some sense) the same as the one that died. So the basic philosophical 
question became: how can it be the same human substance that per-
sists through the radical changes in a human life, then dies, and then 
is resurrected? Paul himself hints at a possible answer: "And what you 
sow is not the body which is to be, but a bare kernel, perhaps of wheat 
or of some other grain. But God gives it a body as he has chosen, and to 
each kind of seed its own body" (1 Corinthians 15.37-8). The underlying 
metaphysics here may be interpreted as follows: There is some sort of 
substantial core that underlies all the changes ofthe substance, includ-
ing the radical changes of death, the disintegration of the flesh-and-
blood body, and the resurrection of a body which, despite its more spiri-
tual nature, contains its former core.8 
3. Scholasticism and Substantial Identity 
For most Aristotelian philosophers, natural objects are constituted of 
two principles, matter and form, and natural events are explained in 
terms of the actualization of the potency of these two principles. 
Roughly speaking, for the scholastics, the substantial forms of bodies 
possess innate powers that incline those bodies to behave in character-
istic ways: fire, for example, contains the innate power to heat and to 
rise while rocks possess the tendency to fall. Although scholastics dif-
fered widely about the right way to characterize matter, form, and sub-
stance, they agreed that the active form combines with the passive 
matter to create an individual concrete substance. For such philoso-
phers, the problem of substantial identity was relatively easy to solve: 
an individual concrete substance like Socrates persists as long as the 
union of form and matter does. As long as Socrates' substantial form 
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organizes and activates his material component, he is the very thing 
that he is. Moreover, the Aristotelian account of substance is perfectly 
consistent with substantial change. The oak tree grows new leaves in 
the spring and yet remains the same thing. Socrates loses his hair and 
yet remains the very person that he is. 
Many scholastics considered their account of identity to be closely 
related to their account of substantial unity. The underlying assump-
tion here is that despite changes to the substance, as long as it remains 
the same unified thing, it retains its identity. The tree regains its 
leaves, Socrates loses his hair, but both substances retain their under-
lying substantial unity. 
There was a good deal of disagreement among scholastics about the 
principle or source of substantial identity and unity. For our purposes, 
it will be helpful to cite briefly some of the relevant claims made by 
Duns Scotus. Scotus famously proposes haecceity or "thisness" as the 
source of the individuation and identity of a substance. For Scotus, as 
long as an individual substance retains the "thisness" of its substantial 
form, it will remain the thing that it is. He asserts: "An actually exiting 
substance, not changed by any substantial change, cannot from 'this' 
become 'not this'. For this singularity, according to what was just said, 
cannot be one singularity and another in the same substance that 
remains the same and is not substantially changed."9 For our purposes, 
the metaphysical tenacity of substantial unity and identity is notewor-
thy. As long as a substance retains its substantial form, "it remains the 
same substance numerically." 
For the scholastics, the substantial form did a lot of metaphysical 
work. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that when the "new 
philosophers" stripped the world of substantial forms, they faced a 
number of difficult metaphysical problems. Before turning to some of 
the most prominent of these problems, it will be interesting to consider 
the tidy success of Aquinas' account of resurrection. 
4. Aquinas on Resurrection 
The Aristotelian notion of substance, as interpreted by many scholas-
tics, seems custom-made to solve the problem of resurrection. In his 
Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas discusses the doctrine at length. 
Citing what "the apostle" wrote in Corinthians, he concludes: "It is, 
then, a necessary tenet of faith to believe that there will be a resurrec-
tion of the dead."lo According to Aquinas, Paul is perfectly clear that the 
resurrection is not just a "spiritual" one and therefore that "it is the 
body that will rise" (SG IV, 79.7). In confirmation, Aquinas cites Job 
who says: "in my flesh I shall see God" (Job 19.25-6). According to 
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Aquinas, the soul is immortal and can exist without its body. However, 
Aquinas' metaphysics requires that the "natural" place of the soul is to 
be joined with its body and therefore the metaphysics perfectly moti-
vates the resurrection of the body. Aquinas argues: "[I]t is contrary to 
the nature of the soul to be without the body" and "since nothing con-
trary to nature can be perpetual . . . the soul will not be without the 
body perpetually .... Therefore, the immortality of the soul seems to 
demand a future resurrection of bodies" (SG IV, 79.10). 
In presenting his account of resurrection, Aquinas deals directly 
with our problem, namely, how the body or corporeal substance can be 
"numerically one from the beginning of his life to the end of it," despite 
life's radical changes. He summarizes his point: 
But in the body of man, so long as he is alive, it is not with respect 
to matter that he has the same parts, but with respect to his 
species. In respect to matter, of course, the parts are in flux, but 
this is not an obstacle to his being numerically one from the begin-
ning of his life to the end of it. (SG IV, 81.12) 
According to Aquinas, "although not everything that is in him materi-
ally in one state is also there in another," this is not a problem since 
"the form and species . . . remain continuously through a whole life" 
(ibid.). In short, "that he should assume again ... the same body and 
bodily parts that were with him in life" is "not a requirement of man's 
arising [from the dead] with numerical identity." Rather, "he need 
assume ... only what suffices to complete the quantity due." In the 
end, then, regardless of the particular material parts, as long as there 
is the relevant quantity and as long as the soul or form is there, the 
body will be resurrected. 
But how does the soul or form create such a robust single thing with 
the matter? The key to Aquinas' answer is his account of substantial 
unity. In part II of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas is keen to 
show that Plato is wrong to claim that the body and the soul are sepa-
rate. The human soul can exist separately from its body (as it does 
between the dissolution of the body after death and the resurrection). 
Nonetheless, when the soul is joined with its body, they "have not each 
a distinct being" but rather "make up one single being."ll Flatly reject-
ing Plato's view that the human soul is related to the body "as its 
mover," Aquinas insists that the human soul is "united to the body as 
its form." He then offers a very nice account of the relation: 
For one thing to be another's substantial form, two requirements 
must be met. First, the form must be the principle of the substan-
tial being of the thing whose form it is; I speak not of the productive 
but of the formal principle whereby a thing exists and is called a 
being. The second requirement then follows from this, namely, that 
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the form and the matter be joined together in the unity of one act of 
being .... And this single act of being is that in which the compos-
ite substance subsists: a thing one in being and made up of matter 
and form. (SG II, 68.2-3) 
Despite the fact that the scholastic account of matter-especially 
Aquinas' notion of prime matter-is notoriously difficult, it seems safe 
to say that when the substantial form of a substance actualizes or 
"reduces" the potency of its matter (reducere ad actum), it necessarily 
forms a unity with it. The matter forming the unity with the form sim-
ply cannot be separated from the form and therefore cannot strictly 
have components added or substracted. For our purposes, it is particu-
larly important that as long as the substantial form in a substance cre-
ates a unity with its material component, the identity of that substance 
persists. Thus, Paul's body might have turned to dust, but when his 
soul reunites with some material component at resurrection, the same 
corporeal substance will exist. As long as Paul's form joins in "one act of 
being" with matter of the appropriate "quantity," the substantial unity 
that is Paul will exist. 
5. Mechanical Physics and Metaphysical Problems 
Descartes' Principia Philosophiae of 1644 was intended to replace the 
scholastic explanatory model as an account of "the entire visible 
world."12 According to Descartes, there is "no phenomenon of nature" 
which cannot be explained by the principles enumerated in his treatise, 
namely, the various sizes, shapes, and motions which are found in all 
bodies. According to Gassendi in the Syntagma of 1658, 
the matter of the world and all the things contained in it is made 
up of atoms ... which God created finite from the beginning, which 
he formed into this visible world, which, finally, he ordained and 
permitted to undergo transformations out of which, in short, all the 
bodies which exist in the universe are composed.13 
Whether it was Descartes, Gassendi, or one of the other first wave 
mechanists, the scholastic explanatory model had to be rejected and 
natural phenomena were to be explained by appealing to matter and 
motion. That is, an explanation of physical phenomena is consistent 
with the mechanical explanatory model just in case it appeals to some 
sort of matter, the features of that material stuff, and its motion. As 
Steve Nadler nicely summarizes Descartes' position: 
Physical bodies just are parcels of matter in motion, collections and 
configurations of such parts. Hence, all the real and apparent prop-
erties of a body (its shape, size, solidity, color, taste, texture, etc.) 
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are explained by means of the size, shape, position or configura-
tion, and motion of its constituent material partic1es. 14 
It did not take long to digest and respond to the philosophical pro-
posals of first wave mechanists. By the 1650s, there were many philoso-
phers prepared to reject the scholastic explanatory model and replace it 
with the mechanical one. What struck many second wave mechanists 
as right about the mechanical philosophy was the idea that the corpo-
real features of natural bodies were to be explained in terms of matter 
and motion, so that there was no need for "mysterious" innate tenden-
cies.15 Whether it was the shape of the wood or the heat of a fire, corpo-
real features were reducible to some form of extension and motion. But 
many second wave mechanists were concerned with the various meta-
physical difficulties posed by the first wave thinkers. Throughout 
Europe, protests were made against the metaphysical inadequacies of 
first wave thinkers. In Germany, Johann Clauberg criticized Descartes 
for not attending enough to the "thisness" of the corporeal substance.16 
In England, Anne Conway proposed that these mechanists had inap-
propriately stripped the world of activityY And in France, Jean-
Baptiste du Hamel claimed that while the new philosophy explains 
many of the phenomena, it does not account for their "ultimate 
source."18 That is, many second wave mechanists would have agreed 
with Leibniz' comments in section 10 of the Discourse on Metaphysics: 
I agree that the consideration of these forms serves no purpose in 
the details of physics and that they ought not to be used to explain 
particular phenomena. In this the scholastics failed . . . thinking 
that they could account for the properties of bodies by mentioning 
forms and qualities, without taking the pains to examine the man-
ner of their operation.19 
But Leibniz is equally clear about the fact that although "the physicist can 
give an explanation of his experiments" by the careful use "of geometric and 
mechanical demonstrations," ultimately he must return to metaphysics. 
6. The Mechanical Physics and the Problem with Resurrection 
If the body of Paul is a collection of extended corpuscles, then it 
becomes difficult to grasp how that collection might be resurrected and 
joined with his soul. Even philosophers who thoroughly embraced the 
new philosophy recognized its weakness on theological points in gen-
eral and on the doctrine of resurrection in particular. Robert Boyle him-
self was keen to show that the mechanical account of nature could be 
made to cohere with Christian doctrines. In Some Physico-Theological 
Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection, Boyle is unwill-
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ing to side-step the issue of resurrection although he admits at the 
beginning of that work that "if God had not had the scripture positively 
reveal his purpose of raising the dead, I confess I should not have the 
thought of any such thing."20 
Leibniz' "return to metaphysics" is overdetermined and he offers 
many different reasons for his rehabilitation of substantial forms 
throughout his life. The most important of these, for our purposes, con-
cerns the doctrine of resurrection. Leibniz is perfectly clear about the 
fact that Descartes and other philosophers who maintain that the 
nature of body consists in extension contradict "our mysteries." In a let-
ter of 1679, he makes the point succinctly: 
There is another important thing in my philosophy which will give 
it access to the Jesuits and other theologians. This is my restora-
tion of substantial forms, which the atomists and Cartesians claim 
to have exterminated. It is certain that, without these forms ... it 
is impossible to explain our mysteries. (A 11.1, 490) 
I have argued in my book, Leibniz' Metaphysics: Its Origins and 
Development, that Leibniz developed some of the core elements of his 
metaphysics in order to explain the Christian mysteries, namely, the 
Eucharist, the immortality of the soul, the trinity, the resurrection, and 
so on.21 He was interested in them all. About the resurrection, he had a 
good deal to say. Consider an essay that he attached to a letter of 1671. 
In it, he discusses the doctrine at length and criticizes Boyle's treat-
ment. The essay, entitled "On the Resurrection of Bodies," is a long-
winded and odd text that considers, among other things, cannibalism 
and the bones of Lazarus. Throughout the essay, however, Leibniz' 
main concern is to explain how the soul may be rejoined with its origi-
nal body at resurrection even though the parts of that body may be 
"scattered all over the world."22 
Leibniz insists that the standard mechanical accounts of matter as 
passive stuff pose grave difficulties for the doctrine. He argues roughly 
as follows. For someone who accepts the existence of body as extended 
stuff (whether Descartes' res extensa, Gassendi's atoms, or some other 
form of extended corporeity), either there is some kind of general mate-
rial stuff or there are material atoms. In the former case, because the 
matter of bodies will be in "continuous flux," there is no single identifi-
able thing to be resurrected. In the latter case, while it is true that 
atoms (by definition) persist and therefore that the atoms of a particu-
lar body could be reassembled, a number of questions arise due to the 
long lives ofthese basic material elements. It is at this point in the text 
that Leibniz indulges in a number of thought experiments involving 
cannibalism. He points out, for instance, that if one person ingests the 
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body of another and absorbs those atoms, then it is unclear to whom 
the atoms belong. Although Leibniz thinks that, at resurrection, they 
would probably belong to the first person to have them, his point is 
that the standard theory of atoms cannot explain resurrection. He is 
keen to make evident that the issue here is important. At the time of 
resurrection, the good Christian wants to make sure that it is her body 
and not someone else's accompanying her soul through the pearly gates. 
For our purposes, the important moral to the story is that there is 
more to a body than organized matter. In the letter accompanying the 
essay, Leibniz writes: "I am of the opinion that in a body, whether of a 
human being or animal, vegetable or mineral, there is a core [Kern] of 
its substance .... This core is so subtle that it remains also in the ashes 
of burned things and can, so to speak, draw itself into an invisible cen-
ter" (A 11.1, 108). That is, Leibniz seems to take up Paul's suggestion 
that I will exist when my core does. But what is this core? In short, it is 
a combination of an active mind or substantial form and some bit of 
passivity that the mind organizes and through which it acts. As Leibniz 
writes, "in everything there is a certain seminal center that is diffused 
throughout the thing" (A 11.1, 116). This center is "the fountain oflife" 
and that "in which the very soul is implanted." The "subtle spirit or 
substance" cannot be destroyed but will survive through fire and other 
changes as "the flower of substance." Leibniz insists that his theory has 
many benefits. Besides solving the problem of resurrection, it explains 
"the generation of plants from seeds," the development of the seed in 
the uterus, and "the essences of chemicals." Leibniz is proud that his 
theory agrees with "the Jews" (A 11.1, 117). He explains: "Indeed, the 
Jews maintain that, in a certain little bone, which they call Luz, the 
soul with this flower of substance remains unconquered by anything 
that happens." Whether it is the development of a crystal, the genera-
tion of a plant, the movement of an object, or the resurrection of the 
body, the same process occurs: there is a core of substance that diffuses 
the thing. 
But what about the dramatic changes which every human being suf-
fers in the eternity of existence? In the letter, Leibniz acknowledges 
those changes. He explains that the core is like "an embryo or seed of 
an animal"23 which contains "the core of the whole body" (A 11.1, 109). 
He insists that "this core of the substance of a human being neither 
increases nor decreases although its clothing and casing [Kleidt und 
Deckel are in constant flux." These fluctuations are extreme. Not only is 
''the core of the whole body" able to spread throughout the body, it is also 
able to "retract itself back to its source and fountain" where it is in a state 
of such subtlety that "no force ... is able to damage it." 
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Leibniz' theory of a core of substance is clever: it explains how a sub-
stance is able to remain fundamentally the same and yet undergo the 
changes of growth and death. In the case of Paul, for example, he grows 
from infant to adult, then dramatically shrinks and expands between 
the moments of death and resurrection. Although all of these modifica-
tions are part of his substance, underneath these variations in his pas-
sive principle stands his unchanged core. Because the core just is his 
soul and body, it is ripe for life, death, and resurrection. 
7. Conclusion 
On the hundredth anniversary of Bruno's death, no self-respecting nat-
ural philosopher would have appealed to substantial forms in explain-
ing the physical phenomena of poor Bruno's demise. The success of the 
mechanical philosophy in the seventeenth century is enormously 
important, and the historical events leading to its dominance consti-
tute a major part of the history of modem science. But its success is a 
much more complicated and varied process than historians generally 
acknowledge. The mechanical philosophy failed to solve a number of 
metaphysical and theological problems. In the second half of the seven-
teenth century, this led many progressive thinkers to reconsider the 
metaphysical grounding of that physics. By focusing on one of the many 
problems that faced the mechanical philosophy, I have tried to excavate 
a part of the history of that reconsideration. There is much more work 
to be done. 
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